Dear ATCA Colleagues; dear IntentBloggers

[Please note that the views presented by individual contributors are not necessarily representative of the views of ATCA, which is neutral. ATCA conducts collective Socratic dialogue on global opportunities and threats.]

We are grateful to Dr Ian Davis of the British American Security Information Council, based in London and Washington DC, for his submission to ATCA, "Iran -- To win without waging war."

Dr Ian Davis is Co-Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). With offices in Washington DC and London, BASIC acts as a transatlantic bridge for policy makers and opinion formers on these issues, and seeks to promote public awareness of security and arms control in order to foster a more informed debate leading to creative and sustainable solutions. Ian has a diverse background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector. He received both his PhD and BA in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, in the United Kingdom. Ian has published widely on British defence and foreign policy, transatlantic security issues, the international arms trade, arms control and disarmament issues. He has made high-level presentations in Washington, DC and in Europe on WMD non-proliferation and transatlantic security issues. He writes:

Dear DK and Colleagues

Re: Iran -- To win without waging war

This is a follow-up to the ATCA submission "The necessity for US-Iran Dialogue." [August 2006]

The prospects for direct US diplomatic engagement with Iran have been more openly discussed in Washington following the publication of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group report in late 2006 (the latest of several US bipartisan expert study groups recommending dialogue with Iran, including a 2004 working group of the Council on Foreign Relations, led by Robert Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United States Working Group led by Lee Hamilton, James Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft). Hopes have been raised by the successful completion of the latest round of six-party negotiations to freeze North Korea's plutonium-production complex. The urgency of resolution has lessened a little with the news that Iranian enrichment efforts have suffered considerable setback from corrosion caused by the uranium hexafluoride feedstock.

Yet the US administration continues to talk and act tough towards Iran. President Bush has used several recent speeches about Iraq to accuse Iran of providing material support for attacks on US troops in Iraq. American soldiers have arrested Iranian diplomats in Iraq, and an additional US aircraft carrier is on its way to the Persian Gulf.

And the ante was upped considerably last week by President Bush's public endorsement of the assertions made by anonymous US military and intelligence officials that an elite branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard is supplying weaponry to Shia insurgents in Iraq - weapons that these US officials say are directly responsible for killing at least 170 American soldiers and wounding more than 600. An anonymous Downing Street spokesman is quoted in The Guardian as saying that Tony Blair had been "at the cutting edge of identifying this problem," referring to his explicit support for an anonymous Ambassadorial briefing in October 2005 alleging a similar influx of Iranian weaponry to insurgents. It became clear that there was little evidence of Iranian government involvement, and the story was quietly withdrawn.

In this latest episode, General Peter Pace, the chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staffs told The Associated Press that while some bomb materials were made in Iran, "that does not translate that the Iranian government, per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this." And the recently declassified summary of the second US National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq made clear that Iran's influence in Iraq "is not likely to be a driver of violence." Hence, there is no smoking gun.

It is clear the US administration is 'building a case' against Iran. What it intends to do with that case is unclear. But while the situation is dynamic and uncertain, some of the major underlying issues have remained constant.

The first of these issues is the need for accountable, farsighted and coordinated problem solving in Washington and the capitals of Europe - as opposed to the irresponsible, short-sighted and largely unilateral US-led action that has led to the failure in Iraq. It would be folly of an even greater magnitude to rely upon a build up of US military forces within the region to pressurise Iran to change course and allow that momentum to determine the choice over military strikes. The US elections of November 2006 demonstrated that Americans are ready for a new approach to national security. Surveys and opinion polls in Europe also confirm a large transatlantic consensus for policies that are effective; policies that reflect a principled and lucid assessment of the best way to achieve national security goals. There is growing repudiation in the pre-emptive use of military force, and a desire for US and European governments to use all the tools in their foreign policy toolkit (diplomatic, economic, intelligence) to tackle complex security challenges.

A second theme is the contrast between the disastrous costs of an unprovoked attack on Iran and the potential lasting benefits of a serious dialogue with Iran. There is broad agreement among military and intelligence experts that there is no good military solution to this problem. While an attack on Iran would have disastrous costs and consequences, without achieving the intended results, the potential benefits of a constructive and open dialogue with Iran are substantial. Building a direct relationship with the government and people of Iran is likely to pay off domestically, for the region, and for the rest of the world.

A third then is that smart, tough-minded multilateral diplomacy - of the kind that has just been applied to North Korea to stop, seal and ultimately disable its nuclear facilities as part of a grand bargain - works, even in the most difficult of circumstances. Diplomatic options with Iran are not only less risky than military options but also more likely to produce real and long-lasting progress - and are a long way from being exhausted.

It will not be easy for the US administration to talk with Iran - nor for some Iranian officials to talk to Washington - and any agreement will require both sides to step back from their red lines and swallow some bitter medicine. But the illusive middle ground is still available for negotiations to develop. Iran may save face, for example, by running its centrifuges without uranium hexafluoride, while the IAEA Board may rest assured that this is unlikely to allow Iran to solve the principle puzzles eluding its mastery of the technology. However, the broad outlines of the negotiation that has to take place are already known to diplomats on both sides, outlined in a communication sent by Tehran to Washington in April 2003 - although the hard work of devising mutually acceptable trade-offs has yet to begin. One such trade-off -- allowing Iran to enrich uranium at the low levels needed for nuclear energy production, provided that UN inspectors were given full access to Iran's nuclear energy facilities -- is supported by a bipartisan majority of Americans according to a recent opinion poll.

A final theme is the need to look at the big picture in the Middle East and globally. A smart, farsighted Iran policy will help stabilise the region and enable progress to be made towards some of US and Europe's most important shared foreign policy goals.

Thus, there is an urgent need to halt the escalating rhetoric and to get serious about diplomatic engagement with Iran across a range of issues. The US administration needs to openly recognize that policy, not regime, change is the goal. The cost of not talking to Iran is unacceptably high, and getting higher. It is undermining regional stability and global hopes of stemming nuclear proliferation. While there is no guarantee that talks with Iran would succeed, the refusal of the US to talk is increasing the likelihood of transatlantic failure in too many important areas.

Best regards

Ian Davis

[ENDS]