Dear DK and Colleagues
          
          Re: UK-Iran Crisis Lessons -- Giving Soft Power Some Teeth
          
          'Speak softly and carry a big stick' - that was the advice of the ebullient 
          American President ,Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, in the early part of 
          the twentieth century and it may still have some relevance today.
          
          The kidnapping by the Iranian revolutionary Guard of fifteen British 
          service personnel in the Shatt-al-Arab waters at the top end of the 
          Arabian Gulf -- and their release today -- raises once again the complex 
          issue of how such situations should best be handled. Whether the captured 
          fifteen are released promptly, which has happened as these words appear, 
          or whether they were going to be held for a prolonged period, the whole 
          incident provides some important lessons for the modern day resolution 
          of international quarrels -- for which Teddy Roosevelt had such a concise 
          answer a century or so ago.
        First, his advice about speaking softly is probably more relevant than 
          ever today in this world of globalized media coverage and instant information. 
          Megaphone denunciations by either side were never going to get anywhere 
          in this ugly incident, as British diplomats clearly realized at the 
          outset. Only after a few days, and with the greatest reluctance, did 
          they release the facts showing that the British sailors and marines 
          were captured in Iraqi, not Iranian, waters - a fact which was, of course 
          promptly disputed by the Iranians with counter-facts and assertions, 
          and a hardening of positions all round.
         So what about the big stick? In Roosevelt days, and in the days of 
          British imperial dominance, that would of course have meant a gunboat, 
          followed by the might of the British Navy and no doubt a battalion or 
          two of soldiers and marines to bring the kidnappers to their senses.
        But that was yesterday. Today blunt military force makes no sense precisely 
          because the world is now such a tight knit network, so that onslaught 
          against any part of it produces paroxysms throughout the whole global 
          system. The Iranians no doubt appreciated that from the start, reckoning 
          that they could therefore proceed with impunity, discounting any direct 
          British intervention or even direct intervention by the United Nations 
          -- despite the fact that the captured personnel were actually operating 
          under a UN mandate in their task of policing Gulf waters.
        In this calculation they proved sadly correct. All the UN Security 
          Council could summon up, in face of an outright attack on fifteen people 
          carrying out UN duties, was a slap on the Iranian wrist which Teheran 
          could safely ignore. So there was no big stick there.
         But in one important respect the Iranians may have proved wrong, and 
          as out of date as many of the commentators round the world, all talking 
          and assessing the rising tension in the language of past such incidents. 
          There may be no big stick in the old fashioned sense, but in the age 
          of total information and data integration there are some new big sticks 
          which require neither gunboats, nor megaphone protests nor UN resolutions, 
          feeble or otherwise. 
          
          Just as Iran, by being an integral part of the world trading and oil 
          supply system, has the power to cause global chaos (for instance by 
          mining the Straits of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Gulf, and blocking 
          eighteen to twenty percent of the world's oil supplies, bringing both 
          energy and financial markets to a state of total crisis), so the reverse 
          applies. 
        For example, through cutting off Iranian access to the global financial 
          system London, helped by New York, and by the European capitals, can 
          in practice nowadays bring the Iranian economy to its knees. 
          
          Already, as part of the pressure on Iran to comply with international 
          rules over civil nuclear development, American and British banks have 
          been preventing the mullahs from collecting the revenues for their oil 
          and gas in dollars. It is only one small step to prevent them selling 
          in euros instead, or indeed selling their oil for hard currency at all. 
        
         But financial networks are not the only ones that can be closed down. 
          The Iranian leaders may talk about America as the Great Satan, and the 
          UK as the smaller Satan. But it is on American technology that the aircraft 
          in which they fly around depend; it is American, Japanese and a bit 
          of Russian technology on which their communications and business systems 
          depend; it is on spare parts and components from Western powers that 
          their entire (and rather rundown) energy industry infrastructure depends; 
          and it is on the European economies, of which the UK is one of the largest 
          (after Germany) that Iran relies most heavily for its export markets. 
          
          
          In a dozen ways the oxygen which supplies a modernizing state like Iran 
          can be turned off and its cities paralysed. No need to talk about force, 
          or 'taking out' Iranian nuclear facilities or any other kind of 'hard' 
          retaliation. Soft power retaliation can do the trick and produce the 
          big stick effect in a way that Teddy Roosevelt never dreamt of, and 
          in a way that even today neither the Iranian high command, nor many 
          analysts round the world yet seem to appreciate. In effect, Iran can 
          be closed down.
          
          None of this invalidates the need to proceed in handling this incident, 
          or similar ones if they should regrettably occur, with quiet and subtle 
          exchanges (the soft voice) as far as possible, and as far as indignant 
          public opinion allows. But it is a reminder that there are still 'virtual' 
          big sticks in the armoury of international affairs.
        If the present incident brings that lesson home to all countries and 
          governments tempted to flout international law and the rules of civilised 
          global behaviour, some positive benefit will have flowed from an ugly 
          and dangerous situation.
        
          David Howell