London, UK - 02 June 2007, 08:08 GMT - The recent turmoils 
    -- physical and digital -- triggered by the decision of the Estonian authorities 
    to relocate the seven-foot Bronze Soldier statue from the Tallinn city centre, 
    where it had stood for sixty years, to the war cemetery, has been broadly 
    covered by traditional and online media as well as by the more in-depth recent 
    ATCA post.
    
    
        
    Dear ATCA Colleagues
    We are grateful to:
      
      Roberto Preatoni based in Tallinn, Estonia, and Milan, Italy, for his submission 
      "The digital bending of Estonia on its physical knees -- The Lessons 
      we are NOT going to learn" to ATCA in response to "Cyber 
      Warfare -- Beyond Estonia-Russia, the rise of China's 5th Dimension Cyber 
      Army."
      
      Dear DK and Colleagues
      
      Re: The digital bending of Estonia on its physical knees -- The Lessons 
      we are NOT going to learn
      
      Tallinn, Estonia, being the base for most of my professional activities 
      as well as the headquarters of Zone-H, the international independent cyber-crime 
      observatory, I had the opportunity to witness the development of the story 
      both from the social and from the digital point of view. In view of the 
      subject matter, I consider myself to have a privileged standpoint: my wife 
      and children are Estonian while the general manager of my Estonian security 
      company is a Russian-Estonian. This, together with a broad circle of friends 
      amongst both the Estonian and the Russian-Estonian communities has given 
      me the opportunity to collect first-hand comments, being able to understand 
      that the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue was just the spark that ignited 
      a process fully loaded with old resentments, nationalism and unresolved 
      political issues. Estonia has been the first former-Soviet Union country 
      to join the European Union, nevertheless it has still a long way to go towards 
      the integration of the two communities that since 1991 have been struggling 
      on the social and political level.
      
      It is not my intention to take a stand and judge as I am neither a sociologist 
      nor a politician but being the founder of Zone-H, I had the opportunity 
      to analyse the facts behind the digital attacks which caused the collapse 
      of the country's critical infrastructure for several days and I'd like to 
      share my views with the distinguished ATCA members.
      
      When we think about critical infrastructure, it might come naturally to 
      some to think about Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
      which power electric grids, power plants, sewage etc, but in the case of 
      Estonia the first national critical infrastructure is the Internet itself. 
      Estonia is well known to be one of the most Internet-connected countries 
      in the world, where almost every single aspect of the average-citizen is 
      managed by IT infrastructures. From eBanking to eVoting, from eParking to 
      Wi-Fi coverage even on its beaches, Estonia was a country small enough to 
      decide in the mid '90s to dare to take the "digital road" step 
      by step via development, implementation as well as self-reliance on top 
      notch IT solutions from scratch, based on the traditional Scandinavian positive 
      attitude towards technology and telecommunications.
      
      The over reliance of Estonian society on information technology was well 
      known by the authors of the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
      that backed up the street protests following the removal of the statue. 
      Although, we had begun gathering some intelligence a few days in advance 
      about the incoming attacks, but our information was not far-in-advance. 
      Scattered information started to trickle through a week before the first 
      attacks, mostly coming from Russian-Estonian or Russian net-citizens who 
      announced their will to use digital fire-power to hit Estonia and bend it 
      on its knees. And so it happened, Estonia did bend on its knees.
      
      This episode, following last February's Prophet Mohammed cartoons' digital 
      protest against Denmark, covered extensively on ATCA, has a lot to teach 
      us:
      
      Heed the Visionaries -- Lesson One: The possibility of large scale 
      digital warfare has been researched, envisioned, announced and understood 
      a long time ago and it has arrived. In this view the mi2g Intelligence Unit 
      and Zone-H have been true pioneers in this field for over a decade, announcing 
      to the world such possibilities [original ATCA submission] when the Internet 
      for the average Joe public still meant a 35 kbits/s bandwidth.
      
      Cheap Innovation -- Lesson Two: Digital firepower is cheap. Attackers 
      nowadays can easily compromise computers located, for example, in South 
      Korea, where the home bandwidth can reach a staggering (by Western standards) 
      150 Mbits/s. New attacking vectors have also been developed, allowing attackers 
      to compromise a single peer-to-peer file sharing hub, zombifying (enslaving) 
      thousands of high-bandwidth computers at once.
      
      Fast Aggregation -- Lesson Three: The digital-divide concept is widely 
      known but the digital-unite one is not yet clear. The Internet is a fast-pace 
      aggregator (think about the social networks and blogs) where unknown people 
      from different countries can meet in their efforts under a shared political 
      or social agenda in the glimpse of a second. In this context, the first 
      case we witnessed was the Pakistan-Brazil cyber-alliance against USA right 
      after 9/11, when hackers from apparently non-related countries and religions 
      united their efforts against a common adversary. Here we must say that official 
      political relationships between countries do not always reflect the citizens' 
      real sentiments which are revealed by their actions in cyber-space, without 
      political control. Our overall impression in relation to the Estonian cyber-incident 
      is that the digital attacks were coming from single or small groups of net-citizens 
      who decided to co-ordinate between themselves rather than an episode driven 
      by the nation state of Russia.
      
      Crushing Power -- Lesson Four: Nothing can easily survive a Distributed 
      Denial of Service, period. Long time ago DDoS mainly meant large size data 
      packets launched against a target. Today, we have TCP floods, UDP floods 
      and the less-known application stressing floods (Zone-H has live examples 
      of its effects as we are under attack everyday). No security appliance or 
      anti-DDoS solution can help against a coordinated and focused series of 
      attacks. It's just pure mathematics, if you have a 100 Mbits/s (100 Million) 
      pipeline and your attacker sends you 1 Gbits/sec (1 Billion) of junk data, 
      your security appliances might prevent the junk traffic reaching your network 
      plug, but the incoming pipeline will still be filled by ten times the amount 
      of data it can handle, virtually disconnecting the target from the rest 
      of the Internet.
      Worse still, any 13 years old young cracker can build a DDoS network capable 
      of several Gigabytes per second firepower in a matter of a few days utilising 
      publicly available compromised computers and bandwidth.
      
      Learn from History -- Lesson Five: We didn't learn the lesson. After 
      the Estonian incident, I was expecting the issue to be widely discussed. 
      On the contrary, it is discussed only among few elite communities such as 
      the ATCA distinguished list.
      
      My best regards to you and the distinguished ATCA members
    
      Roberto Preatoni
      
      Roberto Preatoni (40) is Chief Executive of an international group of security 
      companies: Domina Privacy & Security AS, Estonia and Russia, PITconsulting 
      SPA - Italy & Securitylab SA - Switzerland. He is the author of a book 
      on digital asymmetric warfare "Asymmetric Shadows" (Ombre Asimmetriche); 
      and international Lecturer in IT security, property protection and digital 
      warfare conferences. He also teaches in regard to "Internet Abuses" 
      at the Applied Computer Science faculty of the University of Urbino, Italy. 
      He is the founder of the independent cybercrime observatory of server side 
      attacks "Zone-H" and key teacher in Zone-H worldwide security 
      classes, providing advice to several governments and institutions in matters 
      related to Cyber-crime. He lives between Italy, Estonia, Russia and Japan.
    Read the previous article here: Cyber Warfare -- Beyond 
      Estonia-Russia, The Rise of China's 5th Dimension Cyber Army 
    [ENDS]
    We look forward to your further thoughts, observations and views. Thank 
      you.
    Best wishes