Impact on Confidence of War with Iraq – Asymmetric Risks

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Concern about war between some Western countries and Iraq has mounted in recent weeks. War with Iraq may have important economic consequences as well as political and security-related consequences. First-order consequences might include increased oil prices and higher defence expenditure, at a time when it appears that tax revenues will be rising much slower than government spending. There will also be second order consequences such as the fallout from asymmetric risks. These will depend on the outcome of war and on whether war achieves its objective of bringing peace and stability to the region or, in fact, makes the region less stable.

My Lords, Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

It is a great pleasure to address such a distinguished audience at VISA with strong reinforcement from two noted experts. Both Lord Desai from the London School of Economics and Bill Emmott from The Economist have already covered some of the key points. I am going to speak about the unintended consequences of conflict with Iraq.

Economic Costs

Despite recent events that include the NATO rift and the European show of disunity with the US, it seems that a war with Iraq is likely to take place in March. Weather conditions will make it near impossible to carry out a long campaign in the summer months. If, for whatever reason, the war does not take place in March, it could be postponed until the Autumn. By then other factors such as Pakistan or North Korea could come into play.

Any prevailing uncertainty in regard to the war with Iraq is likely to depress further the capital markets and hinder growth. So, in the end, there may be no choice left but to embark on the conflict in hope of the most benign economic outcome. Most wars in US history have tended to stimulate economic growth partly because of higher defence spending. In contrast, the Gulf war in 1991 was followed by a recession. Even if the war with Iraq is won, it is difficult to envisage how easy it would be to capitalise effectively on the world’s second largest oil reserves. Two scenarios are worth noting:

1. It may be a short and neat war as it is hoped. Various independent studies have calculated that a short war would cost over $50 Billion.

2. If the war is protracted, there may be severe economic consequences in terms of loss of confidence in the West and a longer capital markets downturn, which would tend to undermine support for and satisfaction with Government foreign policy; the costs would also double and cross $100 Billion.

The cost of rebuilding post war Iraq would also be significant and depend on the damage caused – both physical and political. If Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are used by either side, the clean up and recovery costs would be immense.
Over a ten year period, the medium to long term cost of a war that went according to plan would still be in excess of $100 Billion whilst the cost of a war that went horribly wrong could end up out by a factor of ten and cost in excess of one Trillion Dollars.

Most importantly, the war with Iraq may be won on the ground but lost in terms of the battle for the hearts and minds of the 1.1 billion Muslims around the globe. So far the “War on Terror” has avoided being perceived as a war on Muslims. In the war with Iraq, we may not be so lucky. During the Gulf war, the BBC and CNN monopolised media coverage. Now there is Al-Jazeera, the global Internet and eMail access to contend with as well.

The asymmetric threats

In recent weeks we have seen our Prime Minister, Tony Blair, authorise the use of the military to guard Heathrow Airport and the Home Office has reminded us of the potential threat from terrorists, including the use of unconventional weapons. I should imagine that any war with Iraq will exacerbate the threat in this area.

There has been an open threat from a range of radical organisations that they will embark on causing terror and economic disruption should the war with Iraq materialise. No doubt, some of this rhetoric is empty and pulls a veil over the real threat from those who may have been planted as sleepers in the past.

Some radicals may take negative inspiration from what they perceive as a hopeless situation. This could result in small disaffected groups waging asymmetric warfare on the West through Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Digital or Suicide (CBRN-DS) means blended with conventional physical attacks.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 as well as the 2002 incidents in Mombasa, Bali, Karachi and Moscow have introduced the West in particular and the world at large to the risk of asymmetric warfare.

Long tail phenomena

Modelling the fallout from asymmetric attacks be they manifest in cyberspace or in the physical world from chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) threats is of significance to emergency response planners, operational managers as well as the insurance and reinsurance industry. Many of the CBRN threats have long term clean up requirements beyond the initial decontamination and sectioning procedures. Also, entire postal code zones can be affected as opposed to just one room or a building.

Post the Oklahoma bombing, US authorities carried out a simulation to study the effects of a biological weapons attack that unleashes the smallpox virus. By the end of the simulation the disease had spread to 25 states and 15 other countries. It was unclear what would be the most effective global and local responses and how the antidotes would be mobilised.

More recently, Anthrax laced envelopes, which arrived at US Government offices post 11th September last year caused severe disruption within Capitol Hill as certain buildings – including Senator Daschle’s offices – had to be closed so that they could be decontaminated. Although very few lives were directly lost due to Anthrax exposure, the disruption caused to mail handling procedures worldwide was significant, the psychological impact was devastating and the recovery time was measured not in days but months.
Technology led asymmetric warfare

The big fault line visible in the world today lies at the junction of radicalism and technology. Terrorists have organized themselves to penetrate open societies and turn the power of modern technologies, on which we depend, against us.

mi2g started collecting data on overt digital attacks on computer systems across the globe in 1995. From only a handful in the first three years, the number of attacks taking place crossed 85,000 in 2002. Some years have seen a 10-fold increase!

The most significant finding from our intelligence database is that trends in digital attacks over the Internet act as a barometer of political tensions worldwide. It is interesting to note that in recent months the trend of attacks against online systems based in the United Kingdom has escalated – 211 overt digital attacks on the UK in August grew to 479 in September followed by a sudden explosion of activity in October, where a total of 2,253 successful attacks were recorded. And that is not all.

We have seen that there has been a tendency for hackers to choose the "low-hanging fruit" such as ill-prepared small to medium size business enterprises. This is the age of automated attack tools that are freely available on the Internet. As soon as any software vulnerability associated with a particular operating system or application becomes public knowledge, the release and use of tools exploiting that vulnerability takes place within a few hours. As a result, economic damage is incurred and confidence suffers.

The large and well-protected government or corporate networks often require greater time, skill and experience together with extensive "social engineering." As a consequence, such networks are much harder to penetrate.

Blended threats and digital reconnaissance

Equating hacker groups with terrorist organisations that kill people with powerful explosives may not be justified. Having said that, the biggest threat could still be a blended threat: digital attacks that cripple emergency response, transport or telecommunications with some insider help, could be employed by terrorists in conjunction with conventional or CBRN-DS attacks to magnify the effects of their intended disruption and damage.

In recent months, information about critical infrastructure has been ferreted via the Internet and scanning of critical infrastructure components has become more frequent; this has been traced back to IP addresses in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan and Indonesia.

Sophisticated computer programs used by engineers to find stress points and weaknesses in buildings, bridges and dams had also been found at the tail end of 2001 and early 2002 in computers belonging to suspected Al-Qaeda members in Kabul, Afghanistan. So even if the ability of a terrorist organisation to conduct direct attacks against critical infrastructure is limited, cyber attacks can be used as a highly effective reconnaissance tool to enable more effective physical attacks.
Command and control attacks

There is growing concern about "Command and Control" digital attacks, which would impact the critical national infrastructure such as: telecommunications, electricity production and distribution, water storage and distribution, nuclear power plants and gas facilities. This would require extensive insider help.

Former or present employees, who may have specialist knowledge of critical infrastructure and the operation of the SCADA, PLC and DCS systems can execute an attack from the outside, as in the case of Vitek Boden in Australia, who was convicted in late 2001 of hacking into a computerised waste management system and causing raw sewage to be pumped into public waterways.

Addressing the threat of digital warfare

It has been our experience that certain organisations have suffered incredible losses through digital attacks that exploited software vulnerabilities exacerbated by the lack of a proper data back-up regime. One would assume that such regimes were relatively easy to implement.

It is often the case that where really heavy damage has occurred - be it from hacking, viruses or worms - it has been with local insider help from within the victim organisation.

It is crucial therefore to apply security precautions in the area of personnel vetting and monitoring, ensuring that an individual can be completely trusted before they are in any position to cause harm to an organization. Instituting policies to prevent the success of common social engineering tactics is necessary along with a requirement to have the correct legal contracts with personnel, customers and suppliers.

The USD 50 Billion that was reserved by insurance and reinsurance companies post 11th September has led to a significant increase in premiums and a raft of exclusions in most policies. Yet, risk cannot be managed effectively without invoking some insurance measures. The growth of risk exclusions by insurance companies in the area of cyber-crime and terrorism in the past for many areas has necessitated the deployment by vulnerable corporations of alternative methods of risk transfer, but the passing of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in the US by both houses of Congress in November will effectively void most of these exclusions on commercial lines insurance policies and allow much needed government backing to be implemented. In the UK we have the Pool Re system for terrorism cover which is not comprehensive. The UK government is currently hoping to extend this system without having to implement new legislation.

Some thoughts for the future

It is unlikely that governments will choose to remain oblivious to the challenge of daily digital attacks on their citizens and their livelihoods given the economic damage being caused.

Successful overt digital attacks – as opposed to scans, attempts or covert attacks – are predicted to follow the trend, albeit more slowly, established over the last seven years and could number between 120,000 and 140,000 worldwide in 2003. Blended attacks – physical attacks synchronised with digital attacks – could materialize in the coming two years. Although new viruses and worms released in 2003 may reduce, the damage caused by a few killer viruses or worms – some politically motivated - will remain in Billions of Dollars.
If the war with Iraq in early 2003 materialises, USA will remain one of the most attacked countries digitally followed by other NATO member countries and allies. Successful and verifiable attacks against the US are likely to be between 80,000 and 100,000 in 2003.

There will be increasing consolidation and unity in 2003 between fundamentalist and anti-capitalist hacker groups with a united agenda against Western interests. The Israel-Palestine conflict, the Allies’ War on Terrorism as well as the India-Pakistan issue on Kashmir will continue to bring fundamentalist hackers closer to each other. Eastern European, Central Asian, Indonesian and Malaysian hacking groups will continue to assist the fundamentalist agenda.

There could be a backlash on Arab world and other Islamic countries’ online presence from Western vigilante hacker groups in 2003 if pro-Islamic hacking and consequent online damage of Western economic interests continues apace.

If there is a destabilising impact from the war with Iraq on certain Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, and they are subsequently engaged in internal conflict, the digital attacks within those countries and across their neighbours could rise sharply.

Proliferation of broadband (24/7 always on) internet services will result in small to medium size entities as well as individual users (micro entities) coming under more frequent hacker and virus attack. Identity theft, credit-card theft as well as customer/personnel data and software piracy will increase as digital crime proliferates in 2003. Unsuspecting individuals and small to medium size businesses with broadband access could also become surrogates for increasingly targeted Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks as well as providing cover for terrorists.

Conclusions

Based on the collective points raised by the eminent Lord Desai, Bill Emmott and myself, the war with Iraq may have unintended economic consequences:

1. If blended threats of CBRN-DS terrorism coupled with conventional attacks from fundamentalist groups materialize in the West it would be difficult to predict the impact of such attacks on health care, financial services, local government, transport and distribution. Just as it was difficult to envisage the economic consequences of 9/11 such as the bankruptcy of large airlines in the US: United Airlines and US Airways as well as in Europe: Swiss Air and Sabena.

2. The vacuum left behind post the removal of Saddam Hussein’s power base in Iraq could trigger political power fluctuations around Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain as well as Iran and Central Asia. This would affect energy prices, business and consumer confidence.

3. There may be a period of instability where Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may have internal conflict. Any adverse situation within Saudi would influence events throughout the Islamic world. A power struggle within Pakistan would create an Indian sub-continent crisis followed by a global one if her nuclear weapons were to fall into fundamentalist hands.

4. Post war Iraq is a huge challenge for the leadership of Western democracies. Images of millions of dislocated Iraqis or their lack of appropriate protection post the bombings from death or disease would not help the perspective of a just war.

5. It would be mandatory for any participating leader to have dealt with the Iraq situation successfully without causing severe economic disruption – from terrorism or loss of business confidence – at home.